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This paper systematically examines the dominant processes and key issues of China’s governance re-
forms over the last 30 years since the start of the reform and opening policies. It argues that the main
thrust of China’s governance reforms is the shift from monistic governance to pluralist governance, from
centralization to decentralization, from rule of man to rule of law, from regulatory government to ser-
vice-oriented government, and from intra-party democracy to people’s democracy. This paper argues
further that the focus of China’s governance reform includes ecological balance, social justice, public
service, social harmony, government cleanness, government innovation, intra-party democracy, grass-
roots democracy, etc. The variables of governance reform in China are social and economic develop-
ment, the logic of political development, influence of new political culture and impacts of globalization.
After persistent efforts in the past three decades, this paper contends that in China a unique governance
model is emerging which is destined to democracy, rule of law, justice, accountability, transparency,
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Focusing on the main bodies, approaches, objects and orientation of the reform, this article will at first
examine the dominant trends and key issues of China’s governance reforms over the passed 30 years,
discussing their content, methods, targets and orientation. After a brief analysis of the empirical basis of
these reforms, it provides both a preliminary summary of the major achievements and persisting pro-




   Introduction: The Reform and Opening Policies and Governance Reforms
 
From the early 1990s onwards, the word ‘governance’ became a popular term in Western social
sciences, and since the start of the 21st century it has also become a salient concept among Chinese
academic circles. In China the term ‘governance’ was first adopted by economists, and terms such as
“corporate governance” or “corporate governance structure” began to be widely used in discussions of
corporate transformation and enterprise restructuring. Since then, political scientists and subsequently
sociologists adopted the term, using it to refer to state governance and public governance respectively.
In the field of political science, governance refers to administrative activities and processes carried out









have aspects in common as well as substantial differences. One of these substantial differences is that the
role of government can only be executed by the organs of government authority, while the tasks of go-
vernance can be carried out by governmental organizations as well as non-governmental organizations
or joint government and civil organizations. The focus of government is the organs of the state, while the
focus of governance is the entire society. Just as there is a distinction between “good government” and
“bad government”, there is also a distinction between “good governance” and “bad governance”. Good




The pursuit of good governance is the common goal of every national government. State governance and
public governance are to be classified under the category of political administration. The activity of go-
vernance is a form of political activity embodying certain political values. Thus, the reform of gover-
nance constitutes an important part of political reform, and the system of governance forms an important
part of the political system. But in contrast to government, governance technicalities are more important
than values. In social and political life, the operation of governance is a kind of political activity that
tends to emphasize technological aspects. For example, governments under different political systems
all hope to advance more efficient administrative systems, lower administrative costs, better public
services and more civil support. That is to say, every national government hopes for better governance.
It is only through constant reform and innovation that governments can achieve good governance.
Therefore in recent years one national government after another has turned to public sector innovation.
Government reform or government innovation has become a global trend. For example, the U.S. State




 To provide another example,
the United Nations together with its member states launched the “Global Forum on Reinventing Govern-
ment”, which has already hosted seven sessions. This Forum aims to promote innovative government




China’s entire reform and opening project began 30 years ago with a set of political reforms. The Third
Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of CPC at the end of 1978, which has come to
symbolize China’s reform and opening policies, was in fact the launching of political reforms by the
Communist Party of China (CPC). The Third Plenary Session adjusted the power structure of the CPC,




) and work focus. Without this political reform, the sub-
sequent reform of the economic system would not have occured. Some Western scholars, assessing
 
1 On the meanings of governance and good governance, and for a detailed explanation of the similarities and differences between





, (1999) no. 5, pp. 37–41.
2 See Geoff Mulgan: 
 
Ready or Not? Taking Innovation in the Public Sector Seriously
 
, National Endowment for Science, Techno-
logy and the Arts (2007), p. 12.
3 See www.7thglobalforum.org. 
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China’s political development during the reform period according to the standards of a multi-party
system, nationwide universal suffrage and separation of powers, believe that China’s reforms are essen-
tially economic, and see no essential changes in the political system. This is a result of prejudice and
misunderstanding. Along with fundamental economic reforms, China’s political system is also under-
going deep-rooted reforms. In China the influence of the political system on economic development is
more far-reaching than in Western countries. It is fundamental to the Chinese experience that without
reforms of the political system, economic reform cannot succeed. Deng Xiaoping, the late leader of
China’s reforms, was very clear on this point. He stated: “If there is no reform of the political system,




 “If we only carry out reform of the economic
system, and not reforms of the political system, the reform of the economic system will not be success-
ful, because in the first instance people themselves will stand in its way. Work has do be done by people,
but when we advocate devolution other people cling on harder to their power, so what can we do about
it? From this point of view, the eventual success of the entire reform project depends upon the reform




 We can see now very clearly that China’s reform and opening project amounts
to a process of comprehensive social change that encompasses the economic, political and cultural
spheres.
China’s political reform is largely a kind of governance reform. In fact, China’s political reform is not
what many Western scholars understand as reform of the political system – it does not involve changing
the basic political framework. It mainly involves reform of state governance and of the administrative
systems of the state. The Chinese government constantly stresses that it will not emulate the Western po-
litical model characterized by a multi-party system and the separation of powers. Moreover, the Chinese
government strongly emphasizes political reform, in particular focusing on state governance reform
brought about through changes in the state administrative system. At the start of the reform and opening
policies, Deng Xiaoping firmly grasped the importance of reforming the leadership systems of the party
and the state, stating decisively: “If we do not persist in reforming the shortcomings in the current




 Since the reform and
opening policies, the CPC and the Chinese government have continuously emphasized political reform,
and every political report to the Party Congress, and every government work report to the National
People’s Congress has without exception included some discussion of political reforms. The reform of
state governance, or state administration, constitutes an important part of political reform. For example,
the political report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC carried a special discussion on
“accelerating the reforms of the administrative system, and constructing a service-oriented government”,
and clearly stated: “The reforms of the administrative system are an important step in the process of
deepening the reforms.” The Second Plenary Session of the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC
passed the “Suggestions concerning deepening the reforms of the administrative system.” It stated: “The
Party Central Committee and the State Council have always attached great importance to reform of the
administrative system”, “reform of the administrative system is an important part of the reform of the
political system, which is required by objective laws for the superstructure to adapt to the economic
base. The administrative reforms permeate through the entire process of our country’s reform and






   The Principle Line of Governance Reforms
 
Taking a broad view of the path of China’s governance reforms for the 30 years between 1978 and 2008,
we can identify a clear set of trends: From monistic governance to pluralist governance; from centraliza-
 




, Volume 3, Beijing: People’s Publishing House 1993, p. 176.




, Volume 3, ibid., p. 164.




, Volume 2 (2nd edition), Beijing: People’s
Publishing House 1994, p. 333.
7 Central Committee of the CPC: “Suggestions concerning deepening the reforms of the administrative system”, passed by the
Second Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee of the CPC (27 February 2008);
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-03/04/content_7717129.htm. 
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tion to decentralization; from rule of man to rule of law; from a government of regulation to a govern-
ment of service; from intra-party democracy to social democracy.
From monistic governance to pluralist governance: The concentration of all governance power within a
single authoritative institution was one of the dominant characteristics of Chinese politics prior to the
reform and opening policies. This system of monistic governance originated in the system of “the party’s
monistic leadership”. Under such a structure, there was only one body of governance. During the Cul-
tural Revolution, this single authoritative institution was made up of the different levels of revolutionary
committees; in contrast, during other periods it has been made of the different levels of party committees
or party branches. This single body of governance administered not only the state’s political and ad-
ministrative affairs, but also all social and economic affairs. The major shortcoming of monistic gover-
nance was that it led to political autocracy and low administrative efficiency, and stifled people’s crea-
tivity and autonomy. The groundbreaking reforms of this kind of monistic governance commenced with
the separation of party and state, and the state led the way in becoming a relatively independent body of
governance. The merging of party and state whereby the party stands in for the state is the inevitable re-
sult of monistic leadership by the party. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of
the CPC in 1978, in effect the starting point for the reform and opening policies, was aware of this pro-
blem and clearly stated: “We must strive to resolve the problem of the merging of party, state and enter-





regarded the separation of party and state as the bridgehead of the reforms of the entire political system.
In August 1980, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC convened a special meeting on
reforming the political system, starting with the question of separating party and state. Under the lea-
dership of Deng Xiaoping, the party and the state gradually attained a moderate amount of separation.
The party mainly took on the responsibilities of political leadership, while the state mainly took on the
administrative responsibilities. In the 1980s, the Central Committee of the CPC determined furthermore
to implement a separation of state and society, as well as state and enterprise. The party and the state
would no longer continue to directly administer Town and Village Enterprises and rural economic
affairs. Towards the end of the 1980s China began to set up a system of Village Committees in the vast
countryside, and to implement forms of self-government for villagers. By the 1990s, aside from the
original workers’, youth and women’s organizations, civil organizations began to emerge and obtain re-




By then a structure of pluralist governance had begun to take shape, consisting of different levels of
party organizations and state organizations, enterprise and vocational work units and all kinds of civil
organizations. Within this pluralist structure the party and state organizations were the most important
bodies of governance.
From centralization to decentralization: A monistic style of governance is bound to lead to a high level
of centralization, and in the end lead to the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals.
Deng Xiaoping explained this in the following way: “The excessive centralization of power is far too
inappropriate and without due examination all power is concentrated in the hands of the party commit-
tees under the slogan of strengthening the monistic leadership of the party. The power of the party will
always end up in the hands of just a few party secretaries, even just one party secretary, so that the first
secretary will be in command of every decision and will always have the last word. The party’s monistic




 Governance reform must
lead to a change in the function of governance. Since the reform and opening policies, the leadership
levels of the CPC and the Chinese government have begun to carry out large-scale political decentrali-
zation as a way to adapt to the change from monistic governance to pluralistic governance. This kind of
 
8 “Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC”, passed December 22nd 1978, see
 
Selected Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session
 
, Volume 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House 1982, p. 7.
9 The Ministry of Civil Affairs has officially registered almost 360,000 civil organizations. There are up to 3 million civil organi-
zations of different kinds actually in existence, see for example Yu Keping et al., 
 
Chinese Civil Society’s Institutional Environ-
ment
 
, Beijing: Beijing University Press 2006, p. 12.




, Volume 2 (2nd edition), Beijing:
People’s Publishing House 1994, pp. 328–329. 
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decentralization has been launched on three separate fronts almost simultaneously. The first point, start-
ing in the mid-1980s, was central to regional decentralization. The central government devolved a large
amount of political and economic administrative power down to the regions. On July 20th 1984 the
Central Secretariat decided to reform the administrative system of the cadres. It decentralized the juris-
diction of cadre administration and adopted a new structure in which it would only directly administer
the principle leading cadres one level below. This new administrative structure in fact extended auto-
nomous rights for the regions. In December 1993, the State Council decided to fully implement separate
tax systems for the centre and the regions, which amounted to a major devolution of economic power.
Second was the devolution of power from the state to the enterprises that the Central Committee of the
CPC decided to bring into effect starting in the mid-1980s. In December 1984 the State Council
published the “Notification concerning the implementation of limited terms of office for directors
(managers) of state enterprises”, which determined that from the start of 1985 the directors and managers
of state enterprises would be relieved of their original permanent appointments, and a new system of
restricted terms of office would be implemented. In November 1993 the Third Plenary Session of the
Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC passed “The decisions by the Central Committee of the Chi-
nese Communist Party on several questions regarding the construction of a socialist market economic
system”. Under this rule, enterprises became autonomous corporations and were not subject to the juris-
diction of the state. Third was the decentralization of power from the state to society. In a model of
monistic governance all power of society in the political, economic and cultural spheres is tightly con-
centrated in the hands of the state, there are no relatively independent civil organization, nor is there any
substantive societal autonomy. Along with the emergence of pluralist governance, the state began to de-
volve power to society. After the 1980s, autonomy was granted first to rural villagers and then to urban
inhabitants. For China, this was a breakthrough in grassroots democracy and an important step forward
in the decentralization of power from the state to society. Beginning in the 1990s, after this new series
of reforms to the organs of the state, some state organs established industrial associations. For example,
the Ministry of Light Industry set up the Light Industry Association, the Ministry of the Textile Industry
the Textile Industry Association. Correspondingly, some roles that were originally administered by the
state began to be transferred to business organizations, and as such important progress was made in
terms of professional autonomy. At the end of the 1990s and the start of the 21st Century, civil organi-
zations appeared in droves, and the state began to emphasise their role in administrating society. Every
civil organization was made to participate in social administration, and as such the power of the state and
its departments was devolved to specialist social organizations.
From rule of man to rule of law: China is a country with a long tradition of rule of man that has lasted
over more than two thousand years. One of the most painful lessons of the decade long “Cultural Revo-
lution” was the necessity of moving towards rule of law from rule of man. After the reform and opening
policies, the party and the state began to focus on “legality” or “rule by law”. For a long period of time
democracy and legality have been closely associated with one another and accorded equal status. As it
was stated at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of the CPC: “In order to
guarantee democracy for the people, it is necessary to strengthen the socialist legal system to provide
democracy with a systematic basis in law, and to endow this legal system with stability, continuity, and
the highest authority in order to ensure that it is consistent, complied with by the people, strictly enforced




 Following the 1980s, many theoreticians began to advocate “rule
of law”. The principle difference between “rule by law” and “rule of law” is that the former emphasizes
a strict legal basis for carrying out work and administration, and the latter emphasizes the status of law
as the highest ruling authority that no individual or group can transcend. The party and the state have
always attached great importance to this latter concept of the rule of law. September 9th 1979 saw the
publication of document no. 64 entitled “Concerning the resolution on the Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedural Law and the guidelines for their practical implementation by the Central Committee of the
CPC”. This announced the abolition of the system of approving judicial cases by party committees. This
 
11 “Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC”, passed December 22nd 1978, see
 
Important Selected Documents Since the Third Plenary Session
 
, Volume 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1982, p. 11. 
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 During the mid-
1980s, some party leaders began to propose that the CPC, as the only party in power, should also be sub-





 Following the 1990s rule of law became the long-term goal of China’s political develop-
ment, and the Fifteenth National Congress of the CPC convened in 1997 was a significant marker for
this. The political report to the Fifteenth National Congress first clearly proposed the objective of “the




 and not long afterwards this objective was
written into the constitution of PRC, and so from being a political objective of the CPC it became a po-
litical objective of the nation state. After the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC the government
further proposed more concrete objectives for the construction of the rule of law, indicating that the
government was setting an example and taking the lead in achieving rule of law at the state level. The
process of reform and opening is also a process of gradually establishing China’s socialist legal system.
From 1979 to 2005, the National People’s Congress together with its Standing Committee passed 400
laws as well as the decisions on related legal questions, the State Council enacted over 650 administra-
tive regulations, and the local People’s Congresses together with their Standing Committees enacted
over 7,500 local regulations. The objective of the Chinese government is that by 2010 a more or less




From a regulatory government to a service-oriented government: The actual purpose of government is
to regulate the political life of society and to protect the legitimate rights of citizens. The government
thus sets limitations on the political activities of citizens while guaranteeing their rights and interests. As
such, the government acts as a regulator as well as a kind of public service provider. Since the reform
and opening policies, the overall trend of the Chinese government administrative reforms has been a
gradual diminishing of the regulatory function, and a gradual increase in the emphasis on service to the
point where the construction of a service-oriented government has been openly proposed. The 1998
“Proposal for reforming the institutions of the State Council” established “public service” as one of the
government’s key functions. In 2004 Premier Wen Jiabao proposed the “construction of a service-
oriented government”, and in the 2005 “Government work report” he officially confirmed this as an
official government objective and proposed measures for its implementation. Following both the Six-
teenth and Seventeenth National Congresses, the Chinese government further elaborated on the funda-
mentals of what the service-oriented government and the corresponding system of public service would
entail. The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth National Congress held comprehensive discussions on
this question: “The construction of a service-oriented government involves strengthening social admini-
stration and public service. Serving the people is the sacred duty of every level of government and the
fundamental standard for all officials. This entails deepening the reforms of the administrative system
to achieve the most efficient organizational forms and laying greater emphasis on social administration
and public service functions. These processes should be carried out in line with the requirements of the
changing role of the system such that power and responsibility accord with one another, service
functions are strengthened, administrative mechanisms are improved and overall efficiency is raised.
The focus should be to develop social projects and to solve problems of people’s livelihoods. On this
basis the allocation of public resources should be optimized with an inclination towards rural, grassroots
and less developed areas to gradually form a basic public service system geared towards benefiting all
people. This entails an innovative public service system which can improve the methods of public ser-
 
12 On this point, some scholars argue that “rule by law” originated at the 1978 Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central




Rule by Law’ originated at the 1978 Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh




 (April 24th 2008).
13 Central Committee of the CPC: “Notification by the Central Committee of the CPC concerning the necessity of persevering in
upholding the socialist legal system”, October 7th 1986, see the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Clerical
and Research Office Edition, 
 
Selected works from the People’s Congresses
 
, Beijing: Chinese People’s Legislative Publishing
House 1992, p. 166.
14 Jiang Zemin: “Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory, let the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics










 (October 19th 2005), pp. 1–2. 
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 The Seventeenth National Congress
hosted a comprehensive discussion on the fundamentals of what the construction of a service-oriented
government would entail. The issue was discussed from the three angles of improving people’s liveli-
hoods, strengthening society building, and accelerating the pace of administrative reforms. To summa-
rise, the Chinese government is currently endeavoring to construct a service-oriented government focus-
sing mainly on the following five features: constructing a responsible government stressing responsible
government service; increasing public service expenditure and providing more public facilities; de-
veloping a number of legal policies regarding public service to provide institutional safeguards for the
service-oriented government; improving the quality of government services and raising the overall level
of public service; striving to make public services more inclusive.
From intra-party democracy to social democracy: The development of democracy is the steadfast goal




 The basic reason
for the tragedy of the “Cultural Revolution” lays in the weakness of the democratic system. The decade
of the “Cultural Revolution” was hugely destructive to the democratic life of the country. After the end
of the “Cultural Revolution” the entire society recognized the need for developing democracy. Just as it
was stated with heartfelt sincerity at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of the
CPC: “Since in the previous era democratic centralism was not properly implemented but deviated away





 However, the CPC refuses to follow the path of Western-style democracy, being determined
instead to follow the path of socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics. Since the reform
and opening policies, China has gradually formed a distinctive democratic framework made up of
several different systems, including: a system of multi-party cooperation in which the CPC is the sole
leader; a system of people’s congresses; a system of political consultation between the CPC and the De-
mocratic Parties and mass organizations from every sector of society; a system of community autonomy
consisting in principle part of village and residential committees; a system of occupational autonomy
consisting mainly of a system of enterprise workers’ conferences; a system of regional autonomy con-
sisting mainly of a system of autonomy for minorities. China is a great power that is nevertheless still a
developing country. It lacks a democratic tradition, and is relatively backward economically and cul-
turally. The advancing of democracy is therefore extremely difficult. Through 30 years of endeavor, the
CPC has gradually instituted its basic objective of Chinese-style democracy. It has established the ideal
conditions for it, developed its essential form, determined its most important content and laid down a
realistic path for its development. The basic objective for Chinese-style democratic politics is a highly
developed people’s democracy. Following on from the proposal at the Seventeenth National Congress
that: “People’s democracy is the life of socialism”, China’s top leaders at the Second Plenary Session





 The ideal for Chinese democratic politics was stated at the Fifteenth National





The essential form of Chinese democratic politics is the system of people’s congresses. Here
the people elect their own representatives that will make up the organs of power at all levels of the state.
It is thus through these people’s congresses that the people exercise their rights as masters. Grassroots
democracy is the most important factor in the construction of Chinese democratic politics. As it was re-
 
16 Central Committee of the CPC: “Decisions of the Central Committee of the CPC concerning several important questions on con-
structing a socialist harmonious society”, passed by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC (Oc-
tober 18th 2006).
17 Hu Jintao: “Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggle to seize the new triumph of building an
all-round well-off society”, in the report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC, October 15th 2007, Beijing: People’s
Publishing House 2007.
18 “Report to the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC”, passed December 22nd 1978, see 
 
Important Sel-
ected Works Since the Third Plenary Session
 
, vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House 1982, p. 10.






20 Jiang Zemin: “Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory, let the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics ad-
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marked in the report to the Seventeenth National Congress, the development of grassroots democracy





realistically advancing Chinese democratic politics was stated at the Sixteenth National Congress as




 Since the re-
form and opening policies, the most important headway in advancing intra-party democracy and social
democracy was made at the following stages: The end of the 1970s, when the people’s congresses and
local governments at all levels were restored and began to exercise constitutional and legal power. The
1980s, when the people’s representatives below the county levels began to hold direct elections; the CPC
began to abolish the system of permanent terms of office, and to experiment with systems of fixed terms
of office for cadre and standing positions for party representatives; autonomy for villagers and urban
residents was gradually increased. The 1990s, when the CPC began to experiment with rules for guaran-
teeing the rights of party members; trials began for the open elections of township leaders for the party
and the state; clauses on the protection of human rights entered the “Constitution”. From the start of the
21st Century, the CPC began to try out regulations on internal party supervision, and the major task of
selecting party committees through a voting system was put into practice across the board. The system
of competitive selection for party and state leaders and cadres was expanded to encompass a broader
range. The “Law of supervision for the standing committees at all levels of the people’s congresses of
the People’s Republic of China” was passed and implemented. Major laws and policies on public




   The Main Areas of Governance Reform
 
Since the reform and opening policies, China has begun to push ahead with the socialist market economy
and committed itself to developing a democratic form of politics. The role of the state has begun to
change. It has withdrawn from many areas of economics and social administration, and changed from a
state that was involved in all matters, to a limited state. At the end of last century, the Chinese govern-
ment came to the decision that “it must transform the functions of the state to macro-regulation, social





 In accordance with this, the influence of the state must be delimited to accelerating
scientific development, upholding social justice, maintaining social stability and advancing democratic
politics. These alterations in the functions of the state must be accompanied by changes in the remit of
state governance. As state governance has evolved over the passed 30 years the following areas have
gradually emerged as the key issues: ecological balance, social justice, public service, social harmony,
integrity among officials, intra-party democracy and grassroots democracy.
 
Ecological balance.  
 
 Since the reform and opening policies, the massive success of China’s social and
economic modernization has become the focus of world attention. On the basis of comparable prices,
China’s National Product increased by an average yearly rate of 9.7% in the 29 years from 1979 to 2007,
from 403.82 billion Yuan in 1979 to 24,661.9 billion Yuan in 2007. The average domestic GDP per




 However, as we reap the bene-
fits of modernization, we also pay a high price. Amongst the heaviest costs have been environmental de-
gradation, ecological disequilibrium, climate change and the depletion of resources, and the list goes on.
The Chinese government sees very clearly that damage to the ecological environment causes serious
problems for the country and the people. The government began in the mid-1980s to take environmental
protection seriously, and made environmental protection a national policy. In May 1985 the State
Council set up the Environmental Protection Committee, and in December of that year established the
 
21 Hu Jintao: “Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggle to seize the new triumph of building an
all-round well-off society”, in the report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC, October 15th 2007, Beijing: People’s
Publishing House 2007.
22 Jiang Zemin: “Constructing an all-round well-off society, launching a new phase in the project of socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics”, in the report to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, http://www.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/dyxjx/sldbg.htm.
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National Bureau for the Protection of the Environment. In 1987 China published “Important guidelines
for the protection of China’s natural environment”, and in 1989 the National People’s Congress passed
“The environmental protection law of the People’s Republic of China”. In accordance with the require-
ments set out at the “Rio Conference” by the United Nations for all member states, in July 1992 (just one
month after the Conference) the Chinese government began to compile and implement “China’s Agenda
for the 21st Century”. This involved setting up a leadership team and an office, and an administrative
centre. A working group made up of 52 ministries took on the task of setting out and implementing the
specifics of the “Agenda”. According to statistics published by the press office of the State Council in
the white paper entitled “China’s Environmental Protection: 1996–2005”, from 1996 onwards China has
instituted or amended over 10 laws closely related to environmental protection, including amongst
others the prevention of water pollution, protection of the ocean environment, prevention of atmospheric
pollution, prevention of environmental noise pollution, prevention of environmental pollution by solid
waste substances, environmental impact evaluations, and the prevention of pollution from radiation.
Also included are laws related to water, sanitation production, recycling, and agriculture, such as grass-
lands and livestock. The State Council has further instituted or amended over 50 administrative laws
such as “The regulations on constructing a program for the administration of environmental protection”,
and published “Decisions on putting into practice a scientific concept of development and strengthening
environmental protection”, “Several suggestions concerning the accelerated development of the cyclic
economy”, “Notification of recently completed work concerning the building of an energy saving so-
ciety” and other such legislative documents. Departments related to the State Council, local people’s
congresses and local people’s governments have, in accordance with their respective powers, set out and
issued over 660 regulations and local laws. At the same time as developing the law and strengthening
administration, the Chinese government has continued to increase investment in environmental protec-
tion. From 1996 to 2004 China’s investment in the governance of environmental pollution reached
952.27 billion Yuan, 1.0% of the GDP for the same period. In 2006 a figure for expenditure on environ-




 The Seventeenth National Congress of
the CPC likewise indicated that the implementation of certain important policies would form the basis
for constructing an ecological civilization. These included the development of a cyclical economy, the
building of an economical society, the maintenance of sustainable development and the establishment of
environmental consciousness, all of which were written into official political reports.
 
Social justice.   
 
Prior to the reforms, China had a planned economy and system of people’s communes





this system income distribution inclined towards absolute egalitarianism, which proved to be a serious
hindrance to the motivation and creativity of the workers, and hampered the rate of production. In order
to overcome this, Deng Xiaoping as early as 1978 advocated that some people and some regions should
be allowed to get rich first. He stated: “We should allow that some regions, some enterprises, and some
workers and peasants raise their living standards first, since their incomes will be slightly higher due to
the successes from their industrious efforts.” He believed “this policy is of foremost importance, it is a




 Deng Xiaoping’s idea for economic reform was
in fact a strategy of unequal development centered on the concept of “prioritizing efficiency while
addressing fairness”. Its purpose was to break away from egalitarianism and eventually achieve common
prosperity. After the reform and opening policies, right up until the Sixteenth National Congress of the
CPC, the Chinese state continually pursued this development strategy. It massively raised the motivation
of laborers and accelerated the already rising rate of labor production, proving that it was a highly ef-
fective policy.  However, the strategy of “prioritizing efficiency while addressing fairness” was only im-
plemented to break away from egalitarianism, and was not meant to be a primary objective of economic
development. Moreover, while this strategy achieved great results, its negative effects also became
increasingly apparent: disparities in income, and disparities in levels of development between the eastern
and western regions and between urban and rural areas were increasing all the time. This situation was
 




 (June 5th 2006).
26 Deng Xiaoping: 
 
Deng Xiaoping Selected Works (1975–1982)
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reflected by a distribution of wealth with a Gini Coefficient exceeding 0.45, which set alarm bells
ringing. This state of affairs immediately caught the attention of the Chinese government, and after the
Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC Chinese leaders proposed the building of a “scientific concept
of development” that was “people-oriented” and based on balanced development. They repeatedly
emphasized the importance of paying closer attention to social fairness. Premier Wen Jiabao remarked
in a straightforward manner: “Just as truth is the principle value of thought, fairness and justice are the
principle values of the socialist state. Fairness and justice mean respecting every individual, protecting
the legitimate interests of every individual, and creating the opportunity for all-round development for
every individual under the conditions of freedom and equality. If the state’s calling is to develop the





 The Chinese government has adopted a series of important measures for advancing social
justice. For example, it has implemented a poverty-relief strategy, and in the passed 30 years has reduced
the population of people in poverty from 300 million to 20 million. It has promoted across the board a
system of compulsory education for nine years. Across the whole country including urban and rural
areas it has taken preliminary steps towards establishing a minimum rate of social insurance. It has be-
gun to implement on a trial basis a balanced urban and rural development strategy. It has implemented
strategies to open up the western regions, to promote and develop the regions of the northeast, and to
revitalize central areas. It is advancing a new system of medical insurance, has completely abolished
agricultural tax and is building and improving programs for social relief and legal assistance, amongst
other things.
 
Public services.   
 
As part of the governance reforms, the Chinese government – after clarifying its public
service role, and in particular after proposing its goal of building a service-oriented government – has
laid increasing stress on public service, and taken many important steps to improving public services.
First, it has provided more social service facilities, especially with regard to environmental protection,
ecological balance, compulsory education, basic transport, public security and social welfare. These
provisions have been made available through increased public expenditure. For example, in the 2008
“Government work report” Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out that the entire national education budget for
the past five years amounted to 2.43 trillion Yuan, an increase of 1.26 times the expenditure for the
preceding five years. Rural compulsory education has now been entirely incorporated into the budget for
fiscal support. Expenditure on health and medicine for the past five years amounted to 629.4 billion
Yuan, an increase of 1.27 times the expenditure for the preceding five years. Expenditure on social
security for the past five years amounted to 1.95 trillion Yuan, an increase of 1.41 times vis-à-vis the
preceding five years. Expenditure on physical culture projects for the past five years amounted to 310.4
billion Yuan, an increase of 1.3 times against the preceding five years. The government has also been




 Second, the government has
steadily relaxed its regulation of social and economic affairs and of the affairs of private citizens, and
simplified its procedures of administrative approval. For example, from 2002 to 2004 the State Council
has abolished and revised 1806 items. By the end of 2004, the items for approval by units of the State




 Third, comprehensive steps have been taken to cut red tape and to
achieve “one-stop service”, shorten the approval procedures, and decrease administrative costs to make
matters far more convenient for the people. Fourth, administrative responsibility has been strengthened,
and a number of new systems of accountability and inquiry have been implemented with a view to
avoiding the repeated denial of responsibility and laying blame on others – “kicking the ball back and
forth” – that so often happened in the past. Suitable punishments are meted out to those government
officials who breach their duties. Fifth, systems for swiftly and expediently dealing with emergencies
have been set up. After the SARS crisis, the central government led the way in constructing a state
system of emergency management, and required all levels of government and regional governments
to progressively build up corresponding systems of crisis management. In August 2007 the Standing
 
27 http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-03/18/content_7817295.htm.
28 See Wen Jiabao: “Government work report”, First Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress (March 5th 2008),
http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content_923918.htm.
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Committee of the National People’s Congress officially passed the “Law on emergency response of the
People’s Republic of China”. In addition, all levels of the state are continuing to build up a series of
service mechanisms intended to satisfy the special needs of citizens. These mechanisms are designed to
break though normal procedures to deal with urgent matters of public service as they arise. Sixth, the
government has been working to raise the overall inclusiveness of public services, to increase poverty
assistance and transfer payments, and further to direct the benefits of economic reform towards groups
undergoing hardship and those in backward areas.
 
Social harmony.   
 
China’s reform and opening policies have released the forces of production on a vast
scale, which has rapidly raised the living standards of the people. It’s just like the analogy that some
people use – Mao Zedong made China independent but Deng Xiaoping made Chinese people rich. After
social and economic development people have begun to have new political and economic demands, but
on the other hand new problems that modernization has brought along with it have also started to become
more serious. Furthermore, people want more political participation for themselves. They want society
to adhere more to the principles of fairness and justice, and daily life to become more stable and ordered.
They want the relations between people to become more harmonious, and for people’s lives to become
more harmonized with the natural environment. After GDP per capita exceeded 1,000 U.S. Dollars,
Chinese development entered a new stage, and conflicts of interest became sharper and more apparent.
The conflicts of interests between urban and rural areas, between different localities as well as between
different individuals became more marked, and different interest groups began to take shape. The
intensification of these conflicts of social interest can be seen in the continuously growing number of
petitions. In particular the average yearly incidence of group petitions has increased in recent years at an
alarming rate. The dissatisfaction of citizens towards the government is very serious in some areas and
sectors, even to the point of clashes between citizens and the state. A serious level of mistrust has arisen
and different social interest groups have been failing to cooperate with one another. The crime rate con-
tinues to rise, and it is increasingly apparent that people lack a sense of security. The above two issues
converge on a single point, which is that people are more intent on pursuing social harmony. The Chi-
nese government and leaders have reacted to this promptly, and have laid out a long-term plan for con-
structing a harmonious society. When the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC proposed the long-
term goal of constructing an all-round well-off society, they essentially advocated that society must
become more harmonious. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth National Congress proposed the
goal of building of a harmonious socialist society. The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth National
Congress then passed the “Decisions by the Central Committee of CPC on several important questions
concerning the construction of a socialist harmonious society”. This momentous ruling set out the basic
meaning of a harmonious society, as well as the policies for how it should be constructed. It specified
“the construction of a harmonious society should be carried out according to the overall requirements of
democracy and the rule of law, fairness and justice, good faith, vitality, stability and order, and the har-
monious relationship between man and nature. In order to solve the most pressing and urgent problems
relating to the interests of the people great efforts should be made to develop social projects, accelerate
social fairness and justice, construct a harmonious culture, improve social administration and energize
social creativity, whilst moving towards a situation of common prosperity. Society, the economy,
politics and culture should all be developed in coordination with one another.” This ruling determined





 Moreover, the “Decisions” for the first time acclaimed the concept of the harmonious society as
one of the essential attributes of socialism. Setting the goal for constructing a socialist harmonious so-
ciety is a crucial strategy in the process of China’s modernizing as a great power. The totality of socialist
modernization with Chinese characteristics which consists of a unity of three aspects – the construction
of a socialist market economy, democratic politics and advanced culture – is further developed to
encompass harmonious society as a fourth aspect within the totality. At the same time, the concept of a
 
30 Central Committee of the CPC: “Decisions on several important questions by the People’s Republic of China concerning the con-
struction of a socialist harmonious society”, passed by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC
on October 18th 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm. 
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harmonious society also becomes a main point of reference for evaluating the performance of all levels
of the Chinese state and the democratic governance of society as a whole.
 
The integrity of officials.   
 
From an economic point of view, China’s reform and opening is a process
whereby the socialist market economy gradually replaces a planned economy and is then continuously
improved. However, during this process corruption and special privileges among officials have con-
tinued to be a serious problem. This can largely be explained by the “dual-track economy” which existed
for a long time, the monopolization of resources, the weakness of the legal system and influences from
traditional culture. According to statistics, since the start of the reform and opening policies procuratorial
organs examining criminal cases at all levels investigated over 1.029 million cases of bribery involving
over 584,000 people. Of these, around 41,000 were officials at the county level, and over 1,400 were




 Serious political corruption increases transaction costs
substantially and hence directly raises public expenditure. It also wastes state money and impacts upon
investor confidence. It is damaging to the rule of law, and causes the general mood of society to degene-
rate. It undermines public morality, is harmful to social justice and weakens the legitimacy of public
authority. Therefore, keeping corruption in check and building a government of integrity has been a key
part of China’s state governance reforms since the start of the reform and opening policies. In setting up
institutions for an honest government, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of
CPC held in December 1978 established the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC.
In September 1983 the Audit Administration of the PRC was set up, and in November 1986 at the
Eighteenth Meeting of the Sixth National People’s Congress it was decided to restore the Ministry of
Supervision and organs of inspection and supervision at all levels of people’s governments. In January
1993 the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC set up a bureau for cooperating with
the Ministry of Supervision, and in 1996 the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the
Ministry of Supervision began a trial patrol system. In 2003 the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection and the Organization Department of the CPC officially set up the patrol system, and in
September 2007 established the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention. A set of anti-graft and
corruption prevention laws and corresponding regulations have been enacted or revised. These include
the “Penal Code”, the “Law of Criminal Procedure”, the “Law on Administrative Procedure”, the “Law
on Administrative Licensing”, the “Law of Administrative Review”, the “Law on Lawyers”, the “Law
on Administrative Supervision”, the “Law on Civil Servants”, the “Auditing Law”, the “Government
Procurement Law”, and the “Law on the Supervision Function of the Standing Committee of the Natio-
nal People’s Congress”. A number of systems have been set up with a view to building an honest govern-
ment, including the declaration system on cadre income, the system for the integrity and self-discipline
of party members and cadre, the system of people’s supervisors, the informing system for the masses,
the patrol system for discipline and inspection, the system of cadre exchange, the cadre responsibility
system, the system for making public affairs transparent, and the system of supervision by public
opinion. Objectively speaking, the Chinese government is continuously increasing its anti-corruption
drive, many effective measures have been adopted and great achievements have been made. However,
serious corruption is a persistent problem, and keeping corruption in check and constructing a govern-
ment of integrity through innovation of the system remains of crucial importance for China’s future
governance reforms.
 
Government innovation.   
 
The government is the pre-eminent political authority in the state. It remains
located at the centre of civil and political life and public governance. It is the locomotive driving society
forward, while the officials are the in political the driving seat. Whether the government carries out good
governance for the people continues be a question of decisive importance. Simply put, good government
is the key to good governance, and good governance can only be achieved by first implementing good
government. Just as this article pointed out at the start, since the reform and opening policies the Chinese
government has continually worked to reform state administration, and has already achieved undeniable
 
31 Professor He Zengke, based on previous years statistics in the work reports of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, which can be
accessed on the website of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. See previous issues of “Supreme People’s Procuratorate work
report”. 
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results. But government reform is a dynamic process. The development of a fully functioning market
economy, the advance of democratic politics and the continual rising of people’s political expectations
combined with globalization and the impact of new information technologies inevitably presents new
challenges for the government. There are still many problems with the current administrative system that
need solving urgently. For example, the system for making decisions pertaining to the public interest is
excessively compartmentalized. In the current system several departments set different policies on one
particular issue, the responsibilities of different organs overlap and political and civil matters are not
clearly divided. As such administrative costs are too high. These problems persist on a large scale. The
public services provided by the government are still relatively sparse and the quality of these services is
not high enough, nor are they anywhere near inclusive enough. Government decision-making is
frequently carried out on too casual a basis, too many mistakes are made and policies are altered too
frequently. Rules implemented are not always coherent with government policies. The legal system for
government administration is still underdeveloped, and government authority needs to be more firmly
established on a legal basis. “The transformation of state functions is still falling short. The state still
intervenes too much in the operation of the micro-economy and social administration and public services
are still inadequate. There are a number of relatively prominent problems that persist, including the over-
lapping of departmental responsibilities, the disjuncture between authority and responsibility, and the
low level of efficiency. State organs are not organized in a completely rational way and administrative
operations and management systems are still underdeveloped. Supervisory mechanisms and checks on
administrative power are not comprehensive enough. The abuse of power and responsibility, the use of




 As such despite its
urgency the reform of the state administrative system at the core of the governance reforms continues to
be a long-term project. The Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC, as well as the Second Plenary
Session of the Seventeenth National Congress, set out a full plan for deepening the reforms to the ad-
ministrative system. The most urgent aspects needing reform were identified, and the overall guiding
principles for carrying out the reforms were set out. The role of the state is to be transformed on this
basis. The Chinese government will continue to strengthen the legal basis for administration, and
strengthen social administration and public services. This is in order to improve government innovation
and construct a service-oriented government that is responsible, based on the rule of law, transparent,
efficient and honest, so that “by 2020, we will have constructed a well-developed administrative system




Intra-party democracy.   
 
The Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC acclaimed “intra-party demo-
cracy” as “the life of the party”. It set down the path for developing Chinese democratic politics such that
intra-party democracy would be the impetus for developing social democracy. The Seventeenth National
Congress of the CPC reconfirmed this strategy of democratic development. Besides grassroots demo-
cracy, intra-party democracy is pivotal for advancing democratic politics in China. If grassroots demo-
cracy promotes democracy from the bottom up, then intra-party democracy promotes democracy from
the core outwards. The CPC is China’s only ruling party, it is the leading core of Chinese politics and its
position in power is determined on the basis of the clauses of the national constitution. As the actual core
of political authority in China the CPC commands almost all of the state’s important legislative, admi-
nistrative and judicial power. In addition, as a vast party of over 70 million members the CPC draws
together Chinese society’s broad political, economic and cultural elite. Without intra-party democracy
there would be no democracy at the level of core authority. Subjective fears notwithstanding, it can be
stated categorically and objectively that without intra-party democracy real substantive social democra-
cy would be very difficult to achieve. The course of intra-party democracy decides to a large extent the
course of China’s democratic governance. According to the blue print set out at the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth National Congresses of the CPC, the first crucial step towards promoting intra-party democracy
is to protect and actualize the democratic rights of party members, including their rights as subjects,
 
32 “Suggestions concerning the deepening the reforms of the administrative structure by the Central Committee of the CPC”, passed
by the Second Plenary Meeting of the Seventeenth Central Committee on February 27th 2008,
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rights to access of information, rights of expression, participation and supervision. The second is to
reform and improve the party’s internal democratic system focusing on elections and systems of super-
vision, the party committees’ systems for discussing official business and policy-making, the systems of
party congresses and openness in party affairs. In addition, the Seventeenth National Congress mandated
that the “Great New Project of Party Construction” should be promoted in all its aspects, which is also




Grassroots democracy.   Since the reform and opening policies, grassroots democracy has always been
the main focus of building democratic politics in China. Almost every National People’s Congress and
every party congress without exception emphasized the importance of grassroots democracy. Grassroots
democracy directly relates to the vital political interests of the broad masses of the people. It is the
foundation of all democratic politics and as such is of particularly great significance. Prioritizing the
development of grassroots democracy and gradually promoting democracy upwards from the grassroots
is also beneficial for the political stability of society, and assists in building up democratic experience.
The report to the Seventeenth National Congress first of all clearly stated that the development of grass-
roots democracy amounted to “building the political foundation for developing socialist democracy”,
and determined that it should be “promoted as a matter of fundamental importance”. The entirety of the
report was devoted to a special exposition on the development of grassroots democracy, indicating that
grassroots democracy remains a focal area of China’s democratic political development. There are
certain sets of problems that need to be solved urgently if grassroots democracy is to take root. These
include how to deal with the relationship between the party and the state at the grassroots level, the rela-
tionship between the state and the autonomy of the people, the relationship between civil organizations
and the state, and the relationship between citizens’ rights and their obligations. Effectively keeping in
check hindrances to democracy such as the practice of vote buying and the influence of clan power in
grassroots elections, raising the democratic consciousness of citizens and their awareness of the rule of
law are also urgent issues. The key issues of grassroots democratic governance reform will be the fol-
lowing: the reform of village and town institutions; the broadening of channels for citizens’ participa-
tion; the democratizing of policy-making processes; the strengthening of democratic administration and
supervision; the nurturing of grassroots social organizations; the improvement of systems of communal
autonomy and vocational autonomy; the advancing of social autonomy; the broadening of the practice
of recommending openly and electing directly for party and state leaders at the town and village levels,
and the transformation of the style and structure of urban and rural governance.35
4   Concluding Thoughts
From the above historical account and forward-looking analysis, we can see that since the reform and
opening policies China’s public governance has undergone fundamental changes. That said, so what was
it that precipitated these governance reforms? Or to put it another way, what is the actual basis of these
governance reforms? Looking at the big picture, we believe that the dominant variables that have af-
fected Chinese governance reforms the most for the past 30 years are social and economic change, the
logic of political development, the formation of a new kind of political culture, and the impact of
globalization.
China’s economic reforms originated in political reforms, but conversely once economic reforms took
off they had a major impact on the political life of society and the governance reforms. After the 1980s
China began to carry out reforms of the economic system oriented towards the market, and gradually
the previous planned economic system was replaced by a socialist market economy. The original single
collective and national system of property changed into a system that was at once national, collective,
and individual while encompassing many forms of ownership such as individual ownership, joint
34 Hu Jintao: “Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggle to seize the new triumph of building an
all-round well-off society”, in the report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC on October 15th 2007, Beijing: People’s
Publishing House 2007.
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venture and foreign investment. The forces of production were raised by a vast extent, and people’s
living standards became higher. These fundamental changes in economic life are the root causes of the
changes in Chinese governance. The market economy’s basic requirements are that enterprises must
become independent corporations with autonomous management rights. They must be separated from
the state and take on complete responsibility for profits and losses. Under the conditions of a market
economy and the modern enterprise system the state cannot directly interfere in enterprise management
and production but must provide an environment for stable and fair competition for the operation and
management of the enterprises and for the economic interactions between them. This requires that the
state fully develops the legal system and strengthen its supervision of the market. The market economy
requires efficiency. It demands that the government increases its efforts to minimize administrative costs
and to improve administrative efficiency. The market economy has internal limitations, and its internal
logic can spontaneously lead to a growing gap between rich and poor. This requires the state to provide
more public services and to establish a system of social security. Under the conditions of the market
economy different kinds of interest groups begin to emerge. These need channels for expressing their
interests and influencing decision-making. This requires the state to pay more attention to constructing
democratic politics and social administration, and to actively nurture social organizations that are able
to represent different interests. When basic subsistence and material living conditions are no longer an
immediate problem and people have become affluent, their political expectations will steadily grow. As
such the government must work to broaden the channels for citizens’ participation and let citizens enjoy
more democratic and administrative power.
Political development has its own internal logic, and this internal logic determines to a significant extent
the direction and the outcomes of the governance reforms. China is a developing power with quite a
backward economy and culture. Economic development is the most important task of the reform and
opening project, while the political stability of society is the precondition for economic development.
Therefore “stability above all” is a general principle of China’s governance reforms. It determines
China’s governance reforms and the path of “gradual reform” or “incremental reform” which must be
followed. In this process of changing governance there may from time to time be events that break new
ground, but as far as overall governance is concerned there cannot suddenly be a complete discontinuity.
The CPC is the central force pushing forward the changes in China’s governance, and the changes in the
CPC itself impact decisively on this process of change. Since the reform and opening policies the biggest
change in the CPC itself has been its gradual transformation from a revolutionary party to a ruling party.
The substance of this change has been the transformation of the party’s objective from that of struggling
to establish the regime to maintaining that regime. These momentous changes have been carried out on
many fronts – involving the party’s social base, organizational structure, leadership style, policy guide-
lines, strategy, work tasks and ideology. The transformation from a revolutionary party to ruling party
presents many challenges to the party and the state.36 The key to whether or not a revolutionary political
party is able to realize this transformation is whether or not the party’s objectives remain consistent
throughout the transformation, and whether it is able to keep with the times with regard to its mass base,
organizational structure, leadership system, policy guidelines, strategy, work style and ideology. The
CPC, already having undergone this transformation, clearly recognized and did not in any way shirk
from the fact that its position as a ruling party was not just a given, and once achieved could not be taken
for granted.37 Its position as a ruling party can only be maintained and consolidated through continual
governance reform, increasing its capacity to govern and administrate society while satisfying the
continually rising material, spiritual and political demands of the broad masses of the people.
The change in political ideology determines the direction of the reforms of Chinese governance. Al-
though the governance reforms are largely just the technicalities of the political reforms, all the gover-
nance reforms generally speaking embody certain political values, and are entirely carried out under the
36 Jiang Zemin: “Directives on the decisions of the draft work report to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC”, Jiang Zemin
Selected Works, vol. 3, Beijing: People’s Publishing House 2006, p. 439.
37 “Decisions by the Central Committee of the CPC concerning strengthening the party’s governing capacity”, passed at the Fourth
Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC on September 19th 2004. See People’s
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guidance of certain political concepts. Therefore the changes in ideology and political values directly
impact upon the governance reform process. From ancient times onwards China has always paid heed to
ideology, and ideological change has often heralded political change. Deng Xiaoping, in driving forward
and leading the reform project, believed that changes in people’s way of thinking was the precondition
for China’s entire reform project, and hence made “the emancipation of thought” the foremost task of the
reform movement. He said: “If we don’t break the rigid ways of thinking, and if we don’t thoroughly
emancipate the thinking of the cadres and the masses, there is no hope for the Four Modernizations”.38
To put it simply, the emancipation of thought allows people to break away from the old dogmas and
old ways of thinking to propose new ideas and theories that are coherent with social progress and the
requirements of the times, and to use these new ideas and concepts to guide social practice. The fact of
China’s over 30 years of reform is full proof that changes in ways of thinking are intimately related to
social and political progress. In a certain sense, the process of China’s reform and opening is a time of
collision between new and old ways of thinking. It is a process whereby a new thought triumphs over an
old thought and thus spurs on social progress. Broadly speaking, since the reform and opening policies
the CPC’s greatest theoretical innovation has been developing the theoretical system of socialism with
Chinese characteristics including Deng Xiaoping theory, the important ideas of the “Three Represents”
and the “Scientific Outlook of Development”. The new concepts and values of governance discussed
below have transcended traditional political thought and impacted sharply on social and political life in
post-1978 China to forcefully push forward the progress of China’s democratic politics. These concepts
include human rights, rule of law, governance, good governance, good government, constitutionalism,
legitimacy, people-oriented governance, civil society, harmonious society, political civilization, global
governance, government innovation, incremental democracy, transparent government, responsible go-
vernment, service-oriented government, efficient government.39 Some of these political concepts were
ignored in the past or were criticized as being capitalist in ideology. Others have newly emerged since
the start of the reform period. Whether these concepts originated in Chinese traditional thought, Marxist
theory or Western political thought they all deeply embody freedom, equality, justice, harmony and
other core values of human society.
We are currently in an era of globalization, a world historical process of transformation. Its basic charac-
teristic is to produce worldwide a set of intrinsic, inseparable interconnections that continually grow
stronger on the basis of merging economies. Globalization first manifests itself through merging econo-
mies, but the globalization of economic life inevitably has a profound effect on all of social life including
political and cultural life. In the context of globalization the reforms that are directed inwardly, and the
opening up that is direct outwardly, are two indivisible sides of the same coin. Deng Xiaoping and other
Chinese leaders have from the beginning compounded the domestic reforms and the opening up to the
outside world into one general national policy, indicating that they firmly grasped the nature of the
current era. China’s economic development is of a piece with the advance of science and technology,
scientific instruments and equipment, management experience, capital, resources, energy sources and
the market outside China. As such China’s economic development must be open to the outside world.
China must participate in the process of globalization, enter the WTO and other such international
organizations, host the Olympics, enter into international agreements and participate in international
affairs. It must improve its domestic structure of governance so that it accords with the basic norms of
international society. For example, setting up the Special Economic Zones was a breakthrough for the
reform and opening policies, demonstrating that the environment for domestic governance should to a
certain extent adapt to the needs of international capital. Therefore foreign management systems, value
concepts and lifestyles have inevitably crept in along with the opening up of the economy. In its foreign
relations China not only has introduced capital, technology and experience, but according to its situation
has also adopted many value concepts and administrative systems from other countries. The establish-
38 Deng Xiaoping: “Emancipate thought, seek truth from facts, look to the future unified as one”, Deng Xiaoping Selected Works,
Volume 2 (2nd edition), Beijing: People’s Publishing House 1994, p. 143.
39 For a detailed discussion on the emancipation of thought and political progress, see Yu Keping: “The emancipation of thought and
political progress”, in Yu Keping’s book The Emancipation of Thought and Political Progress, Beijing: Works of Social Science
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ment of the socialist market economy is the most important achievement resulting from learning and
adopting ideas from Western economic systems. Human rights, rule of law, good governance, constitu-
tionalism, civil society, service-oriented government, responsible government and other such concepts
were originally introduced from the West. The important commitments in recent years to service-
oriented government and responsible government, and the promoting of such measures as “one-stop
service”, the “system of accountability”, “service commitment” and the “public hearing system” were
also originally borrowed from Western countries. Looking back over 30 years of change in governance,
none of the progress that has been made in China’s democratic governance could have taken place
without learning from and adopting the advanced achievements in political civilization made by other
countries.
However, China’s model of governance has its own obvious characteristics. Through 30 years of
exploration since the reform and opening policies China is now creating a special governance model
that is different from both traditional socialist models and Western capitalist models. Although in
our opinion this model of governance with Chinese characteristics is still in its status nascendi, some
of the main features of this governance model are already apparent. These include for example the
concepts of people-oriented governance, and the idea that intra-party democracy drives the develop-
ment of social democracy. The fact that the influence of civil society on public governance is relatively
weak, and the serious problem of corruption are also features of the Chinese governance model. The
following five characteristics in particular distinguish the Chinese model of governance from Western
models.
First, a kind of incremental reform based on path dependence. China’s political reform is a kind of incre-
mental reform in contrast to a “shock therapy”. The essence of incremental reform lies in maximizing
the interests pool of the people without damaging or depriving them of their established interests. Incre-
mental reform not only encourages innovation and reform, but also attaches great importance to, instead
of simply abandoning, the advantages of traditions. Incremental reform recognizes the fact that reform
should be a gradual process, which doesn’t mean it denies breakthroughs. With the evolution of political
development logic, some sort of breakthroughs will eventually occur. Such “breakthroughs” are im-
portant steps towards democratization without triggering off comprehensive and sudden changes. The
strategy here is “small steps will make great difference”, i.e. firstly conducting pilot reforms in some
region and then implementing them to a larger sphere after gaining experiences and lessons.
Second, a pluralist structure of governance led by the party. Governance in China is already pluralist,
but the organs of all levels of the CPC constitute the most important parts within this pluralist system. In
Western countries it is usually the government that is the main institution of public governance. In con-
trast, China’s public governance system is one of “the party leads the government”. In public gover-
nance, the party organs have a stronger influence than government. Where the party committee and
government organs are at the same level, it is the party committee that represents the core authority and
has more power in policy decisions. Compared with the party organs, the role of the government in
public governance is more about executing the policy decisions made by the party. Moreover, now there
are already over 3 million organizations of the CPC at all levels, a number far exceeding that of govern-
ment organizations. In many social areas that do not have government organizations there is usually a
party organization that carries out the responsibilities of public governance.
Third, the complicated horizontal-vertical structure of governance. China is a power with a monistic
governmental structure. The central government governs the state through two systems of authority, one
vertical and the other horizontal. The vertical power structure, often referred to as “columns” (tiao), is
characterized by administration from the top-down – power works in a longitudinal direction that
emanates downwards from both the central government and the provincial governments. The horizontal
system of authority, often referred to as “rows” (kuai), is characterized by laterally organized administra-
tive organs consisting of all regional levels of party and state organs. The combination of columns and
rows constitutes the highly complex “matrix structure” of China’s public authority. This matrix structure
reflects the relationships between the centre and the regions, the higher and the lower administrative
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the National Congress, the government and the National Congress, as well as the relations between the
different departments.
Fourth, the core value that stability is placed above everything. The protection of social stability and
order is an important value and objective for all public governance. For China, a power in the process
of social change, this value is of particular importance. Without social and political stability there could
not be rapid economic development or secure living conditions for the people. Thus, all the leaders of
China from Deng Xiaoping to the present regard “stability above all” as a core value of governance, and
use this as the principle standard in evaluating public governance. In the political discourse of traditional
China, the principle meaning of social stability was stability of the regime and the status quo. Since the
reforms, such traditional notions of stability have undergone substantial changes. Social stability in-
creasingly emphasizes the importance of public order, and the concept of “dynamic stability” based on
“fluidity” has gradually begun to replace a “static stability” based on “barriers”. The traditional notion
of static stability was essentially understood as a freezing of the status quo, and the maintaining of
the existing order through oppressive means. The modern notion of dynamic stability is essentially
understood as balance within progression, and the maintaining of a new balance through continual
adjustments. The essence of dynamic stability is to use a new balance to replace an old balance, and
to make order transform from a stasis into a kind of process. The report to the Fifteenth National
Congress of the CPC expressed just this kind of dynamic stability as “advancing reform and develop-
ment within social and political stability, achieving social and political stability within reform and
development”.40
In the end, both rule of law and rule of man are important elements of governance. In any public gover-
nance, both the system itself and the individuals working within the system are bound to have important
effects. However in the case of China, which lacks a basis in rule of law in its political and cultural tra-
ditions, the effect of individuals is of particular importance. After the reform and opening policies China
attached increasing importance to rule by law, and in the 1990s officially proposed the objective of
constructing a socialist state on basis of the rule of law, and in fact made great progress in this respect.
Yet, China nevertheless has a tradition of rule of man that has lasted over 2,000 years, and the establish-
ment of the rule of law will take a very long time. During this time rule of man will continue to play a
large role in much of the work of public governance and will even have a stronger influence than the rule
of law. The authoritative documents, policies and directives from the party and the government and the
speeches, reports, and instructions from the higher to lower levels of the party and government
leadership at all levels still largely function by way of the “unwritten rules” of political life, and these
still feature strongly in the activities of governance. If public governance is to achieve the best results, it
is necessary for public administrators to realize the practical importance of rule of man. As far as China’s
public governance is concerned, finding an appropriate balance between rule of law and rule of man
constitutes an important step towards better governance.
The ultimate aim of Chinese governance reform is to achieve good governance. According to our under-
standing, there are 10 elements of good governance: 1) Legitimacy. Social order and public authority
should be consciously recognized, and should be yielding in nature. 2) Rule of law. The law should
become the highest standard in public government administration, and all individuals should be equal
before the law. 3) Transparency. That is, open access to political information. 4) Accountability. Admi-
nistrators must take on responsibility for their own actions. 5) Responsiveness. Administrators and the
administrative structure must react promptly and responsibly to the demands of citizens. 6) Effective-
ness. Administration should have a high level of efficiency. 7) Participation. Citizens should enjoy
broad political and social participation. 8) Stability. Within China there should be peace, lives should
be orderly, residents should be secure, citizens should be united, and public policies should be coherent.
9) Integrity. Government officials should be committed to the public and law-abiding, upright and
honest. 10) Justice. Citizens should have equal political and economic rights regardless of sex, class,
40 Jiang Zemin: “Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory, let the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics
advance towards the 21st Century” in the report to the Fifteenth National Congress of the CPC, People’s Daily (September 12th
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nationality, cultural level, religion or political beliefs.41 According to these criteria, although China’s
governance reforms have seen momentous progress since the start of the reform and opening policies
there remain many obvious shortcomings and deficiencies. For example, the government does not have
a high level of public credibility. The rule of law is not sufficiently established. The level of official
corruption and special privileges is still at a peak level. State public services are seriously insufficient.
The mechanisms of dynamic stability are not yet fully developed. The disparity in social incomes con-
tinues to increase. Government accountability is not yet established and administrative costs are exces-
sively high while efficiency is low. The role of civil organizations in public governance is weak, public
participation is not guaranteed, and the instituting of public policies is not democratic enough. All of
these problems present major challenges to China’s democratic governance. The future of China’s
governance will depend to a large extent on solving these problems effectively. However, whatever
political reforms China carries out, and whatever kind of governance model takes shape in China in the
future, for China’s far-sighted leaders the objectives of the governance reforms are already very clear:
democracy, rule of law, fairness, responsibility, transparency, integrity, efficiency, and harmony.
(Translation by Jane Hayward)
41 See Yu Keping: Democracy and the Gyroscope, Beijing: Beijing University Press 2006, pp. 84–86.4   Concluding Thoughts               25
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